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ABSTRACT. The problem of an affordable, responsive, and reliable microsat launch system
(MLS) has bedeviled the small-satellite community, especially in the United States, for decades. Rides
on dedicated vehicles may cost $15M or more, while shared space is hard to find and harder to fit with the
schedules of microsat operators.
Several efforts to build an MLS, generally focusing on cheap expendable launch vehicles (ELVs),
have failed, as did the government’s much-touted Bantam launch vehicle effort in the 1990s. Today,
there are several options, both reusable and expendable, in development, as government agencies and
corporations respond to the growing interest in microsats by trying once again to solve the problem.
In pursuing these efforts, it is instructive to consider why the problem was not solved long ago.
A reliable and relatively affordable MLS, the NASA-developed Scout, was built over four decades ago.
Since then, technological advances should have made duplicating its success a relatively minor problem.
Why has this not been so?
The answers range from the volatile microsat launch market to the fixed costs involved in launch
ranges and safety standards, to the technology itself. This paper examines MLS development efforts past
and present, analyzes the technical and economic factors retarding their success, and offers prescriptions
for the organizations now attacking the MLS problem.
(LEO).1 This capability would cover most
research microsats, clusters of nanosats, and
many military and commercial satellites, like
Orbital’s 46-kg Orbcomm and the 28-kg XSS-10
inspection satellite built for the U.S. Air Force
(USAF).

Introduction
The desire for an affordable, responsive, and
reliable microsatellite (microsat) launch system
(MLS) is nothing new. Today, developers of
microsatellites, especially in the U.S. where
export controls make launching on foreign
vehicles difficult, face a complex and often
impossible situation. Rides on dedicated
vehicles cost $15M or more, while shared space
is hard to find and harder to fit with the
schedules of microsat operators.

Accordingly, this paper uses the Bantam
capability as a starting point. Since few
launcher designs are aimed at exactly this
capacity, somewhat larger vehicles, if they
promise to cut launch costs, and smaller
microsat launchers are examined as well.

What is a microsat launcher? The definition
used by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) for its Bantam LowCost Boost Technology program (to be
described later) was a capability to lift 150
kilograms (kg) into polar low Earth orbit

Recent efforts to replace the MLS-type vehicles
of the early Space Age with a cheap expendable
launcher have failed. As several companies and
government organizations pursue the elusive
goal of the ideal MLS, it is vital to understand
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why the problem has resisted solution. This
paper examines MLS development efforts past
and present, analyzes the technical, economic,
and organizational factors retarding their
success, and offers prescriptions for those now
engaged in the MLS field.

institutions, and even of many government
programs. 6 So Pegasus, while a success, is not
the MLS solution.
The Situation
Microsat builders outside the U.S. have a variety
of options, mainly using launchers developed in
the nations of the former Soviet Union. For
American companies, the high costs of domestic
launchers, coupled with launch costs and export
controls and the legal requirements for U.S.
government-sponsored payloads to use
American vehicles as much as possible, make
launch a serious constraint hampering the longpredicted explosion of microsat development. 7

This paper focuses on the most difficult part of
the microsat launch problem - development of a
dedicated U.S. vehicle that will lower costs
sufficiently to bring about expanded use of
microsats and remove launch as a constraint.
(Unless otherwise noted, all costs presented in
this paper are in FY04$M.)
Background
The first U.S. launch vehicles were all microsat
launchers. The Vanguard and Jupiter C were
very inefficient, measured by the common
standard of the cost per kilogram placed in orbit.
They had payload capabilities under 30 kg to
LEO and success records of only 50 percent.2
Ballistic missiles and the space launchers
derived from them were generally designed
along aerospace industry principles emphasizing
low weight and maximum payload, a formula
not conductive to low cost for an expendable
machine built in relatively small quantities.3
NASA replaced the first launchers with the allsolid-propellant Scout, which served from 1960
to 1994. The final version, the Scout G, could
put 210 kg into LEO for about $13.3 million
(M)4 [or $.063 million per kilogram (M/kg)].
The microsat market became less important in
the U.S. as satellites grew larger. By the 1980s,
when new technology expanded the capabilities
of microsats, the Scout was nearing the end of
its career. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) took the lead in
buying a new rocket. The option the agency
chose was the Pegasus, being developed by
Orbital Sciences Corporation. The air-launched
Pegasus has proven a reliable design, but
predictions of flights costing $8-10M proved
optimistic. 5 The current Pegasus XL, able to put
over 280 kg into polar LEO, costs at $20M or
more: beyond the reach of most academic

The largest U.S. developer in terms of numbers
has been Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC),
whose 34 Orbcomm communications microsats
have been launched in groups of up to eight on
the company’s Pegasus vehicles. This success,
though, does not carry over to most microsat
development. Many science satellites need
specific orbits, making it difficult to share space
on Pegasus or larger launch vehicles. Rides on
the Space Shuttle are now rarely available.
Secondary opportunities on larger launchers do
not always save money, and many payloads are
bumped several times before funding, the right
launch opportunity, and the readiness of the
payload come together. (The XSS-10, launched
in January 2003 after many delays, was an
example.) It is costly and sometimes impossible
to keep a microsat program alive while waiting
years, in some cases, for an appropriate launch
opportunity. Robert Sackheim, Assistant
Director of Marshall Space Flight Center, went
so far as to say the main problem with secondary
launches is, “You hope to live long enough for
your payload to be launched.”8
It is the authors’ contention that the full
exploitation of microsats will require an
American MLS that meets critical needs for a
dedicated ride at low cost, on a reasonable
timeline. Other measures have gone as far as
they can to address the problem. The authors
were unable to locate anyone in the microsat
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development community – government,
academic, or private – who is satisfied with the
current launch situation.

Lessons from Recent History
Over the past 20 years, there have been several
efforts to build smaller, cheaper U.S. launchers.
An examination of these efforts is important in
identifying lessons to apply.

The Demand
It is impossible to put an exact figure on the
number of microsats NOT built because of the
launch problem. That the evidence is imprecise,
though, does not make it less compelling.
The Space Test Program of the Department of
Defense (DoD) can afford to launch only 20
percent of the payloads approved by its Space
Experiments Review Board.9 Many of these are
microsats or experiments suitable for microsats.
The USAF’ s PICOSat and XSS-10 microsats
were delayed for years by launch opportunities
and its TechSat-21 constellation has been
canceled, due in part to the costs imposed by
dragging a program out for years while
searching for an affordable launch.10 The 10satellite DoD-University Nanosatellite initiative,
originally planned for a single launch in 2001,
has decomposed into three missions with no
firm launch dates. 11 The University of New
Hampshire’s CATSAT and the student-built
Starshine II are sitting in storage with an
uncertain future. NASA’s University-class
Explorers program was suspended in large part
due to high launch costs.12 Many proposals for
other microsats, including commercial ventures
such as KitComm, have evaporated or are stalled
short of the hardware stage, due in part to the
difficulties associated with securing a launch
platform.13
The 2003 ASCENT study of space markets,
performed for NASA by Futron, found the size
of the small payload market was much more
strongly affected by launch costs than were the
larger payload markets. The study found that
“science payloads funded through universities,”
many of which are microsats, “are likely to
increase in number due to a relatively modest
drop in launch prices” and that a 75 percent
decline in the cost of launching small payloads
would trigger more than a 200 percent increase
in such flights through 2021.14

In 1981, a startup called Space Services Inc.
(SSI) began work on the Percheron, a liquidfueled modular launcher built of identical
components 12 meters (m) high and 1.3 m in
diameter. The first vehicle exploded during a
static test. A second vehicle was never built
because the company failed to obtain the
customers or retain the investors needed. 15
SSI changed its design to solid-fuel systems and,
in 1982, flew a single-stage suborbital test
vehicle based on the Aerojet M56-A1 used as
the second stage in Minuteman ICBMs. In
1990, SSI was purchased by EER Systems,
which switched to commercially available
Thiokol solid motors. When the first Conestoga
1620 (with a capacity of 880 kg to LEO) was
flown, it suffered a control failure and was
destroyed. EER planned a second flight but was
unable to raise funding.
Pacific American Launch Systems, founded in
1982 by Gary Hudson, planned the Liberty
family of launchers. The Liberty I launcher was
a two-stage, liquid-fuel design, with each stage
having a single engine. Stage 1 used
LOX/kerosene and stage 2 used the toxic
N2O4/MMH. The vehicle would cost $2.5
million to place a 220-kg payload in polar LEO.
Liberty had only reached the engine test stage
when DARPA let the first contract for the
Pegasus. The financial backers of Liberty
dropped out, figuring Pegasus would capture the
small-launch market. About $2 million had
been invested before the company gave up in
1989.16
In 1988 came MicroSat Launch Systems, which
partnered with Canada’s Bristol Aerospace in a
venture called Orbital Express. Bristol is a
leading builder of sounding rockets, and the
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Orbital Express was to use Bristol’s proven solid
fuel motors. By 1990, the partners had designed
a launcher with a 140-kg capacity and a price tag
of approximately $3.5M. Several further
evolutions of this design took place to meet the
needs of prospective customers, but firm deals
proved elusive. In 1993, the only signed launch
contract, with DoD, was canceled. 17
AeroAstro, one of the first companies formed
specifically to build microsats, explored entering
the launch services market with its PA-X
launcher. The PA-X was a two-stage, liquidfuel design intended to cost about $6M per
launch. 18 The engine was to be a simple
pressure-fed type derived from TRW’s Lunar
Module Descent Engine. According to CEO
Rick Fleeter, the company discovered it could
lower the hardware costs for the launcher. But
building a cheap microsat launcher proved
difficult because overhead costs, such as range
expenses, are not proportionate to the size of the
rocket. As with other ventures of the early
1990s, the PA-X also had to compete against
Pegasus, which had won government customers.
PA-X never attracted sufficient funding or
demonstrated economic feasibility, and the
project ended in 1995.19
Many of the early U.S. launchers had their
origin in components built for intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The idea of
converting surplus ICBMs directly to launchers
has surfaced many times. In the 1990s, with the
retirement of the solid-fuel, three-stage
Minuteman II ICBM, the concept was
reexamined. The Air Force funded design of
small orbital launchers based on Minuteman,
although the 1996 National Space
Transportation Policy severely restricted when
these could be used, a policy designed to protect
private-sector launch companies. Several
designs were produced by Lockheed-Martin
under the Multi-Service Launch System (MSLS)
contract, but the contract expired without any
such vehicles having been ordered.
Its replacement, the Orbital/Suborbital Program
(OSP) contract, was awarded to Orbital. The

first two OSP vehicles were successfully
launched in 2000. The idea of a relatively
simple modified Minuteman morphed into
something much larger, often called the
Minotaur. The Minotaur uses the upper stages
and payload fairing from the Pegasus XL, mated
to the first two stages of a Minuteman II. The
Minotaur can place over 400 kg in LEO but,
with a total launch cost estimated as high as
$19M, [$.0475M/kg], did not succeed in cutting
launch costs for microsats.20
In 1997, NASA issued a request for studies to
develop a new MLS called Bantam. The goal
was a rocket with a 150-kg capacity to a 370km
polar LEO and a cost of no more than $1.5M
($1.65 in FY04$M, equating to $.011M/kg) in
“recurring marginal cost” per flight. (Placing
150 kg into this orbit equates to approximately
210 kg into low-inclination orbit from Cape
Canaveral.) NASA provided study money to
four companies. Unfortunately, according to
NASA’s analysis, none of the resulting designs
appeared likely to cut costs below $3M. This
would still have been a major improvement, but
NASA opted to shelve the program.21 Rocket
Development Corporation, a partner on one
team, even reported that a launcher the size of
Bantam could not be operated commercially and
therefore was not worth building, since the
development costs could not be recouped by
flying a small number of Government-sponsored
payloads.22
Current Initiatives
There have been – and are – too many “paper
rockets” to cover in detail. However, a
comparison of the technology choices and cost
projections offered by some of the current
developers of MLS-type vehicles is in order.
Development of Microcosm’s Sprite launcher
has been partly funded through AFRL. The goal
of the program is a clean-sheet modular design
(the orbital launcher has seven identical
propulsion “pods”), which would place 220 kg
into polar LEO for a price estimated at $2.5M
23
[$.011M/kg]. Microcosm has opted to go with
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a pressure-fed liquid-fuel rocket, using LOX and
kerosene in high-pressure composite tanks.
While a pressure-fed system allows designers to
leave out expensive turbopumps, the tanks make
some launch experts nervous because of the
failure of a larger composite cryogenic tank
during the NASA X-33 program. Microcosm
engineers, though, believe smaller tanks can be
built to high reliability, as the weight saved by a
pressure-fed system allows for heavier tank
construction.24 The Sprite would be the largest
pressure-fed rocket ever launched. Two
suborbital vehicles have been flown, and four
more are planned to prove the technology and
concept of operations. The first orbital flight
(assuming continued funding) could occur as
early as 2006.25
The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space
Vehicles directorate (AFRL/VS) has proposed a
minimal vehicle which could be launched from
an F-15E fighter. The launcher would be a
three-stage solid-fuel design able to orbit up to
100 kg. An early estimate (1999) pegged
development costs at $200M, with a $1 million
recurring cost per booster [$.01M/kg]. 26 That
option included developing new highperformance motors. The laboratory is currently
focusing on a version using off-the-shelf motors
which would cost less to develop. Recurring
costs are now estimated at about $5M
[$.05M/kg].27
SpaceDev, a builder of small satellites, has
proposed a launcher called Streaker with a
capacity of 315 kg to polar LEO. The total price
of a Streaker launch is expected to be under
$10M [$.032M/kg].28 SpaceDev has chosen a
different technical direction from its
competitors. Streaker would use a hybrid rocket
motor, combining solid fuel with nitrous oxide
as the liquid oxidizer. (SpaceDev purchased the
assets of AMROC, a company which sought to
develop a hybrid booster but collapsed after the
first test article burned on the pad in 1989.)
SpaceDev says its engineers have redesigned the
hybrid motor (historically viewed as inefficient)
to produce an efficient, low-cost engine burning

HTPB (a common rubber compound) with
nitrous oxide. 29
Space Exploration Technologies (Space-X) has
chosen a different approach for its Falcon small
launcher (capacity about 350 kg to polar LEO).
Space-X has benefited from a steady financing
source, the private investment of CEO Elon
Musk. (By contrast, Microcosm has had to slip
its program by several years due to fluctuating
funding.)30
Many companies look to minimize development
difficulties and R&D costs by using as many
off-the-shelf components as possible. The staff
at Space-X has taken an opposing view: as
company vice president Gwynne Gurevich puts
it, “Legacy components equal legacy costs,” and
too much reliance on outside vendors creates a
risk of uncontrollable cost increases. Space-X
engineers have looked at existing technology but
largely opted to build or subcontract their own
designs, wanting to take maximum advantage of
modern manufacturing and materials technology
but avoiding the need for any breakthroughs.31
Space-X is offering a firm price of $6M
[$.017M/kg] and has two customers signed.
Musk predicts four or five launches a year can
be sold at that price to DoD and NASA “when
the government responds to the reality of a truly
low-cost reusable launcher.”32
The first-generation Falcon is a two-stage LOXkerosene vehicle, with a pump-fed first stage
engine and pressure-fed second stage. The first
stage will be recovered by parachute for re-use,
an idea never realized in practice on a large
liquid-fuel rocket. First launch from a former
Atlas pad at Vandenberg AFB is slated for
December 2003.33
Several other private efforts – some now
moribund, others still active – have emerged in
the last few years. JP Aerospace, the High
Altitude Research Corporation (HARC), and
Starhunter Corporation are developing these
three balloon-launched concepts. Other groundlaunched systems were pursued by Rocket
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Propulsion Engineering Company (RPe), whose
Prospect LV-1 would carry over 200 kg to LEO,
and Thurber Space Systems, which seeks to
build a liquid-fuel booster in the same class.34
The LV-1 would use a pump-fed system with
composite tanks and H2O2 for the oxidizer. The
LV-1’s recurring cost is estimated at $2.3M,
plus range and integration. 35
DARPA is funding the Responsive Access
Small Cargo Affordable Launch (RASCAL)
project. RASCAL will use a custom-designed
Mach 3 aircraft, a high-performance design with
thrust-augmented jet engines and all-composite
structure, as a reusable first stage. An
expendable upper stage will be released
exoatmospherically at Mach 1.3. The idea is to
orbit up to 110 kg for “$5,000 per pound or less”
[$.011M/kg].36 The development contract went
to a small California firm, Space Launch
Corporation (SLC), which will develop
technology both for RASCAL and a private
version, the SLC-1. A demonstrator flight by
2006 is hoped for. SLC’s planning assumes the
SLC-1 version will be able to orbit a 50-kg
37
payload for a total price of $1.5M [$.03M/kg] .
A new factor in the development of the MLS is
renewed DoD interest. In addition to the hightech RASCAL effort, Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) and its development arm,
the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC), are joining DARPA in are acquiring a
responsive, low-cost small launch vehicle (SLV)
as part of the Operationally Responsive Spacelift
(ORS) effort. The SLV will launch suborbital
test vehicles for DARPA’s hypersonic
technology effort and for global conventional
strike as well as placing microsats in orbit.38 The
dual propose of the SLV offers the prospect of
additional business for the launch contractor
should a strike system be approved and
developed for operational use.
The strike option puts a premium on
responsiveness, a factor usually not crucial in
space launch missions. Accordingly, companies
building for the microsat market, which
emphasizes low cost and reliability, must also
pay attention to the speed with which their

systems can be launched if they want to appeal
to this potential additional DoD market.
Responsiveness has, in recent years, led the
military to prefer solid fuels for its long-range
suborbital missiles. However, suitably designed
liquid-fuel systems can also be loaded and
launched quickly.
The Two Pillars
The U.S. has no shortage of launch facilities
suitable for MLS. Pads for small launchers at
Cape Canaveral, Wallops Island, Vandenberg
AFB, and Kodiak are all far underused, and airlaunched systems will not need pads. Also,
there is no lack of industrial capacity to build
small launchers or microsats.
Accordingly, the two pillars undergirding a
“right service/right price” solution to the MLS
problem are technology and cost. To state these
as questions:
1. What technology is most suitable for a
practical MLS? Will the MLS solution(s) be
modernized versions of proven designs, or will
they be innovative or even radical solutions?
Propulsion technology, usually the most
expensive component of a rocket’s hardware, is
the key variable here.
2. At what price point would the microsat
market be opened up, allowing the current
microsat developers to launch their microsats
and encouraging institutions not now building
microsats to build and enter the market?
Of the two pillars, cost is the most complex. We
know how to build rockets. Building them
cheaply is the challenge.
Technology Factors
Every type of launch option for the MLS has
either been investigated or tested – launch from
fixed pads, aircraft, balloons, and barges, among
others. Each has its advocates, but so far the
workable small launch vehicles have, with the
exception of Pegasus, been pad-launched. A pad
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been accomplished). The two flight-proven
vehicles, Pegasus and Minotaur, are estimated at
approximately $20M and $19M per flight,
respectively. 39 Figure 1 (below) displays the
relationship between Capacity to polar LEO and
Cost (FY04$M).

launch offers the lowest infrastructure costs,
with tradeoffs including the limited range of
launch azimuths from any particular pad and
some loss of vehicle efficiency compared to
rockets launched from altitude.
Many different types of propulsion options have
been investigated. The rocket propulsion efforts
so far can be sorted into solid, liquid (cryogenic
and non-cryogenic), and hybrid systems, with
several variations of each. SSI and Microcosm
investigated grouping several small propulsion
“pods” into a type of horizontal staging. Other
manufacturers have used more conventional
vertical staging (usually with two or three
stages) or have used an aircraft or balloon as the
first stage.
Technology Lessons Learned
Looking at the historical record, launchers have
both succeeded and failed using liquid and solid
fuel. The only serious hybrid effort to date,
AMROC’s, failed. The many disagreements in
the propulsion field – solid vs. liquid vs. hybrid,
pressure-fed vs. pump-fed, composite tanks vs.
aluminum, and clustering vs. single-system – are
likely to continue for a long time. What matters
most is that the decisions on these matters are
made as part of an integrated approach to the
whole vehicle that takes in cost, operability,
manufacturing labor, etc.
There is not any single technology path, which
guarantees success or failure. Despite the
prominent position of propulsion in Dr. Elias’
cost breakdown in Table 1, the decisions about
which propulsion method to use or to stage or to
launch the vehicle, appear less critical than the
overall program execution.

While cost is inextricably intertwined with
technology, things other than technology also
affect it: range costs, launch licensing, and use
of a flight termination system (FTS) acceptable
to range safety authorities, etc. Since these
ancillary costs do not scale down
proportionately with the size of the rocket, they
place a floor (approximately in the $1M range)
under the launch price of any U.S.-launched
MLS.40
Launch costs of existing vehicles have proven
heavily dependent on the flight rate. This
creates a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma –
fewer flights mean higher costs meaning still
fewer flights, and so on, as the fixed costs of
maintaining a production line and launch
infrastructure are spread over a small number of
flights, driving up marginal costs. For a
privately financed vehicle, there is also the need
to earn back the R&D investment.
Dr. Antonio Elias of Orbital Sciences, designer
of the Pegasus, offered this breakdown of the
cost of a notional small launcher:
Small Launcher Cost Breakdown
Item
% of Launch Price
Propulsion
25.7
Mission Support Labor
25
Amortization of DD&E
21.4
Assembly Labor
8.6
Avionics
8.6
Flight Termination
System and Range
7.1
Structures
4.3
Table 1. Components of a Small Launcher’s Price41

Cost Factors
The authors obtained estimates for nine MLS
vehicles: two flight-proven systems now in
operation, and seven now in some stage of
development (meaning some hardware work has
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Weight vs Cost
R2 = 0.4617
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Figure 1. Weight vs Cost (Includes flight-proven systems)

Weight vs Cost
R2 = 0.5567
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Figure 2. Weight vs Cost (Excludes flight-proven systems)
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In evaluating cost for an MLS, it is important to
remember that cost and efficiency are not the
same thing, and the difference is stark with small
launchers. The most efficient way to launch a
satellite is to use a launcher appropriately sized
for the payload. Measured in $/kg, a large
launch vehicle appears cost effective but often is
not so in reality, at least from the payload
developers perspective. Microsat builders need
low per-launch costs, which may involve a
launcher that is, by the per-kg measure, very
inefficient.
Another factor related to cost is risk. Increased
R&D investment can cut risk by thorough
testing, but investment funds are hard to find for
most MLS developers. At the same time, most
companies cannot afford a failure of their first
launch vehicle. This creates a very difficult
situation – made more difficult by the fact that
the Holy Grail of the MLS business, low
recurring cost, depends to some degree on how
much money a company invests in designing its
vehicle. Recurring and R&D costs are not
opposites, but they are usually antagonists. For
example, companies often cut R&D costs by
buying off-the-shelf components, but such
components are not necessarily good choices for
low operating costs.
The authors began their study for this paper by
focusing on per-mission cost. However, it
became clear that efficiency and payload
capacity also mattered, since microsats are so
often launched in numbers larger than one, and
this is likely to continue even in the presence of
a low-cost MLS. That makes the correlation
between weight (total payload capacity) and cost
a factor of interest. Since the cost per kg is
generally higher in the small-launcher market, so
the comparison of interest is between MLS
candidates rather than among all launch
vehicles.
The correlation coefficient, R, measures both the
strength and direction of the relationship
between two variables measured from the same
subject. The Coefficient of Determination, R2,
represents the proportion of variation in the

dependent variable that has been explained or
accounted for by the regression line42, or as the
proportion of variance in cost that is contained
in weight. [Note: A trend line is most reliable
when its Coefficient of Determination value is at
or near one.]
For the nine pairs of data, the correlation
coefficient is .68 and the Coefficient of
Determination is .46. Hence, there is a medium
positive correlation between weight and cost, in
a linear sense, within the bounds of this data.
Using the Coefficient of Determination, 46
percent of the variation in cost is explained by
weight.
As this shows, the correlation between payload
and cost is not perfectly linear (R ≠ 1). Other
factors that contribute to cost are terms of
individual contracts (e.g. who pays for weather
delays?), flight rate, variations in range pricing,
the cost of integration between the payload and
vehicle, etc. Interestingly enough, if the two
flight-proven vehicles are removed [(255, 20)
and (385, 19)], the graph takes a slightly
different turn, as shown in Figure 2. The
Coefficient of Determination is now .5567,
indicating that this trend line is more reliable
than the one computed using the flight-tested
systems in the data set.
What does this tell us in practice? The fact that
the weight vs. cost predictions of the MLS
developers are closely related shows the analysis
of this factor is consistent even when performed
by different companies. This indicates the
correlation is a valid one and is likely to be close
to reality when new MLS systems are built.
Cost and Market
There is a market for a low-cost MLS, although
it is very difficult to quantify. Estimates offered
by payload developers of the cost per flight
required to significantly expand the market
range from $1M to $6M.43 This translates to a
range from $10K/kg to $33K/kg. Estimates of
the recurring cost of a suitable launch vehicle
that might emerge from current programs from
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MLS developers range from $1.5M to $10M.44
This translates to a range from $6K/kg to
$50K/kg.
Figure 3 (below) displays the inputs from the
Payload developers. Focusing on the Bantamlike weight of 150 kg, the authors received a
variety of inputs: a range from $1.5M to $5M.
(The outlier on this chart, $6M, is a figure
Space-X offered based on its own market
studies.) Depending on the value of the payload
to the developer or perhaps the Return on
Investment, the $5M may be an “affordable”
figure compared to the flight-proven options.
Figure 4 (below) compares the estimates of MLS
developers to the Payload developers’ desired
launch cost for the 150 kg range of satellites.

In Elias’ example, this was $3.0M on a $14M
vehicle. Elias feels $14M is the lowest practical
price for a “minimum” launch vehicle. 45 (Not
surprisingly, the other launch companies
strongly dispute this point. The authors agree
this estimate seems to be based too much on
current practice without allowance for
innovative cost-reducing ideas in either
technology or operations.)
Whatever one’s opinion on the proper numbers,
Elias’ breakdown shows the question of
development funding is huge. A launcher which
relies on investors who must be paid back is
inescapably going to cost substantially more
than one in which an independent source
provides the development funding.
Interplay of Cost and Technology

The data is not very firm, given that none of the
vehicles involved have been flight-tested, but a
picture does emerge of a tradespace in which
technology and economics can meet. Space-X’s
Falcon estimate of $6M probably represents the
high end of this zone of opportunity. Obviously,
the lower costs can go the better. As to size,
while we focused on the Bantam definition of a
minimum launch capacity; the market is
obviously greater if an MLS offers higher
capacity while keeping the cost low.
This is a simplification, because some science
and R&D satellites can share rides, and some
commercial ideas call for launching in clusters.
However, it is necessary to begin somewhere,
and this overview at least provides a starting
point for the more in-depth analysis not possible
in a short paper. Again, the authors focused on
the availability of a dedicated MLS because that
is the element currently missing from a market,
which does offer secondary slots and larger
launch vehicles.
Finally, note the effect of development costs in
Dr. Elias’ breakdown (Table 1, above).
Amortization of design, development and
engineering (DD&E) expenses accounts for over
21 percent of cost.

Historically, with aerospace endeavors, new
technology required has almost always been
more difficult and costly to develop than
proponents had forecast.46 This does not mean
new technology must be avoided. It does mean
developers must expect that “pushing the
envelope” is expensive (as was demonstrated
with the X-15 and SR-71, two successes in
breakthrough aerospace technology which went
far over initial cost estimates), and challenging
technology development requires funding
reserves and commitment to be successful.
Developers also must recognize, expect and plan
ways to mitigate cost, schedule, and technical
risks when testing new technology. Builders of
the NASA/OSC reusable X-34 demonstrator
blamed their fatal cost overruns on NASA’s
insistence on reducing the risk of failure to
nearly zero by requiring more oversight and
redundant systems.47 Risk is also increased by
the understandable desire to keep budgets
reasonable by making the leap to the final
system in as few jumps as possible.
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Figure 4. M LS Developer Estimates compared to Payload Developer Desire

Dr. Terry Bahill of the University of Arizona
surveyed 20 development projects for his
textbook Metrics and Case Studies for
Evaluating Engineering Designs. He found that
a breakthrough design approach may cost three
times what a continuous improvement model
does for the same performance.48 As EER and

SSI learned, an initial failure may mean the end
of the enterprise, especially for a small
company. Since the chance of such a failure is
impossible to avoid entirely, this points to the
need for a mix of risk reduction (with
incremental rather than leap-ahead technology
insertion) and proper funding. A company
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whose internal reserves or external contracts are
inadequate for this contingency is at high risk no
matter how its hardware is designed.
The Last Step: Execution
A program can have a superb design and
excellent cost-cutting ideas, yet still fall prey to
mistakes in execution. Loading a program with
too many requirements and saddling it with a
cumbersome and/or costly management
structure are two of the ways past launch
programs have been crippled.49
For a successful MLS, the requirements must
not be stretched beyond the basics. As Henry
Vanderbilt of the private Space Access Society
put it, “Consider the pervasive tendency for any
potential low-cost launch project to get latched
onto by all the major government launch
customers and end up stretched to gargantuan
size and performance to meet all their
requirements. Add in the tendency for multiple
government R&D centers to lobby to have their
pet technologies incorporated, and you have a
recipe for repeated failure.”50
Successful X-vehicles have traditionally been
produced by organizations which have been kept
as “lean” and collocated as the scope of the
project allowed. (While the X-33 was promoted
as a “Skunk Works” project, it was considerably
more spread out through the newly merged
Lockheed and Martin Marietta than Skunk
Works successes like the SR-71 and F-117 had
been when they were achieved with the key
51
people under one roof. )
Wernher von Braun, whose revolutionary V-2
came out of such an “under one roof” shop at
Peenemunde, insisted that his missile
development efforts at Redstone Arsenal in the
1950s be organized along similar lines. Von
Braun felt it was critical that everyone on the
project be able to talk to each other face-to-face,
and that the manager step out of his office and
into the workshops.52 While this is not practical
for a gigantic project like the Space Shuttle (or

von Braun’s Apollo efforts), it is good advice for
the MLS.
A development effort which is part of a large
government entity is subject to covering its
share of the overhead structure, as well as to
having its budget “taxed” for headquarters
activities and cut to fund “must-pay bills” which
crop up elsewhere in the organization. This
often-overlooked problem requires that the
project be carried out, to the extent possible, in a
small, dedicated organization, or that the budget
be “fenced” by top-level directives. The
alternative – development schedule stretchouts
and higher costs – is acceptable in a program not
aimed at lowest possible cost (for example,
building a Stealth bomber), but is guaranteed to
be lethal for an MLS effort where cost is #1.
Can We Build the MLS, and How?
There are classically three ways of building
something at lower cost: Build more, build in a
new way (i.e., using a new cost-saving design),
or build more efficiently. While all these will
probably need to be combined for a successful
MLS, building in quantity will have to wait until
the market develops in response to a proven
vehicle. (A pod or cluster design like
Microcosm’s is a form of effort to build in
quantity, although it necessarily has some
tradeoffs in the mass fraction devoted to
structures and thus the vehicle’s efficiency.)
Most of the MLS concepts now under
development include at least some new ideas or
emerging technology, from Space-X’s
recoverable first stage to SpaceDev’s large
hybrid motor. Building and operating with as
small a team as possible is a nearly universal
theme, an understandable one given the large
role labor plays in small-launcher costs (see
Table 1).
Some recommendations for a workable MLS
program emerging from this study include:
•

Development based on venture capital or
other private investment from outside the
launch vehicle company is not practical.
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The proven market is not there to attract
investors. Even if it were, the need to pay
back the investors would minimize the
new vehicle’s potential to cut launch
costs.
•

Practical financing sources are thus
limited to government contracts (e.g.,
Microcosm) or internal investment (e.g.,
Space-X). Accordingly, the role of the
government in deciding to invest to break
the chicken-and-egg cycle looms large.

•

New technology, or a new design
approach, may be important for drastically
lowering costs in the absence of an
established market. However, the degree
of new technology must be carefully
balanced against the risks involved.

•

A design which maximizes operability
(even at the expense of increased R&D
funding), and uses modern technology
without requiring a breakthrough has the
best chance of success.

reductions. As illustrated by the estimates of
cost and capacity for the in-development MLS
systems considered above, the cost numbers are
somewhat clustered together and there is some
competition for this niche, which will also help
stimulate cost savings. The most important
finding of this paper is simply that MLS
development is possible within a cost range
appealing to the Payload developers’
expectations.
____________________________________
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•

A lean, dedicated organization (be it
corporate, government, or a hybrid) whose
budget is not subject to constant raiding
for other priorities is essential.

•

Design to cost (including operability cost)
is more important than maximizing
performance (common with launch
vehicles) or designing for mass production
(common with aircraft).

•

The developer must have sufficient
resources (internal or external) to survive
an early failure.
Conclusions

A practical, affordable MLS is not outside the
reach of American technological expertise. If
we accept that it will take time for the market to
expand, then the keys lie in intelligent design
and management to maximize the cost
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